The 2016 Burman Lectures in Philosophy
Making Things Up
Professor Karen Bennett, Cornell University.
10-12 October at Umeå University
Lecture 1: Building
Monday October 10 at 13.15-15, Humanities building, Lecture hall F
Abstract: I characterize a class of relation I call ‘building relations’: roughly, relations whereby less fundamental phenomena are made of or generated from more fundamental phenomena. I argue that it’s better to speak generally about a class of such relations than to claim that there is a single most privileged one. Finally, I defend the claim that such relations are a) antisymmetric and irreflexive and b) necessitating in a particular sense against some recent claims to the contrary.
Lecture 2: Causing
Tuesday October 11 at 13.15-15, Humanities building, Lecture hall F
Abstract: I argue that the class of building relations is causally tainted in the following two senses. First, causation itself counts as one, and second, various particular building relations frequently obtain in virtue of causal facts.
Lecture 3: Relative Fundamentality
Wednesday October 12 at 13.15-15, Humanities building, Lecture hall F
Abstract: Philosophers frequently help themselves to relative fundamentality talk. But what does it mean to say that one thing is more fundamental than (or ontologically prior to) another? I argue that we cannot treat the relative fundamentality facts as primitive, and instead must account for them in terms of building. I go on to provide an account of the more fundamental than relation in terms of building, and defend it against various objections.
All interested are welcome to these lectures!
Arranged by: The Department of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Umeå University.
Previous Burman Lectures
Elizabeth Anderson, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
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Lecture 1: Why Pragmatism?
Lecture 2: How to Be a Pragmatist 1: Correcting Moral Biases
Lecture 3: How to Be a Pragmatist 2: Experiments in Living
Michael Smith, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
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Lecture 1: "The Standard Story of Action"
Lecture 2: "A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons"
Lecture 3: "A Case Study: The Reasons of Love"
Prof. David Chalmers, Australian National University and New York University
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Lecture 1: Constructing the world
Lecture 2: Three puzzles about spatial experience
Lecture 3: The structuralist response to skepticism
Stephen Finlay, University of Southern California
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Lecture 1: Metaethics: Why and How?
Lecture 2: The Semantics of ”Ought”
Lecture 3: The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
Dag Prawitz, Stockholm University
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Tim Crane, University of Cambridge
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Lecture 1: Existence, Being and Being-so
Lecture 2: Existence and Quantification Reconsidered
Lecture 3: The Singularity of Singular Thought
Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University
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Lecture 1: What kind of theory is the Theory of Natural Selection?
Lecture 2: The problem about `selection-for`
Susanna Siegel, Harvard
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Lecture 1: The varieties of perceptual intentionality
Lecture 2: The contents of visual experience
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Lecture 1: Transparency and Self-Knowledge
Lecture 2: Knowing that I am thinking
Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading and University of Texas, Austin
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Lecture 2: Practical Reasoning and Inference
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Lecture 1: The Epistemological Problem of the Neuroscience of Consciousness
Lecture 2: How Empirical Evidence can be Relevant to the Mind-Body Problem
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Lecture 2: Foolishness and Cognitive Values
Hubert Dreyfus, Berkeley
Lecture 1: What is moral maturity? A Phenomenological Account Of The Development Of Ethical Expertise
Lecture 2: The primacy of the phenomenological over logical analysis: A Merleau-Pontian Critique of Searle's Account of Action and Social Reality
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Lecture 1: A Simple Refutation of Mindless Materialism
Lecture 2: Universals, Particulars and the Logic of Predication
Susan Haack, University of Miami
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Lecture 1: Social Science as Semiotic.
Lecture 2: Sociology of Science: The Sensible Program.
Howard Sobel, University of Toronto
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Lecture 2: Ultimate reasons if not first causes: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz on 'the Ultimate Origination of Things'.
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